Don't forget about levels of explanation by Anderson, M. & Reid, C.
  
MURDOCH RESEARCH REPOSITORY 
 
 
 
 
This is the author’s final version of the work, as accepted for publication  
following peer review but without the publisher’s layout or pagination.  
The definitive version is available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2008.06.005       
 
 
Anderson, M. and Reid, C. (2009) Don't forget about levels of 
explanation. Cortex, 45 (4). pp. 560-561. 
 
 
 
http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/7852/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright: © 2008 Elsevier Srl. 
 
It is posted here for your personal use. No further distribution is permitted. 
 
 
 
Discussion forum 
Don't forget about levels of explanation 
Mike Andersona, Corinne Reidb 
a The University of Western Australia, Australia 
b Murdoch University, Australia 
 
 
The basic point of this contribution is to emphasise that in understanding the link between 
neuroscience and developing educational programmes, we have to do more than pay lip-
service to the fact that they operate at very distinct levels of description and abstraction. We 
should clearly acknowledge that there are at least three levels of relevance here – the 
biological, the cognitive and the behavioural. Current neuroscience straddles the biological 
and the cognitive and current educational practice and research straddles the behavioural and 
the cognitive. It is simply premature and disingenuous to claim that anything currently in the 
literature straddles all three levels. Or at least in such a way as to convey the impression that 
biological facts and theories currently have implications for educational practice that offer 
anything distinctive from that offered by cognitive theories. A simple example might make 
this point. Our concept of autism, and indeed what kinds of educational regimes might be 
effective in responding to it, has been profoundly influenced by developments in cognitive 
neuroscience in the past 20 years. If we allow that the acknowledgement of a biological basis 
to autism stems from work in neuroscience (interpreted broadly, and certainly including 
genetics) then this has been a major contribution in understanding the cause of autism. 
However, we would submit that exactly what this biological basis is and indeed what specific 
genes may or may not be involved, or what neurochemical pathways are compromised (or 
whatever), while of the greatest scientific interest, is of little or no importance to educational 
planning over and above the basic fact that there is a biological cause of autism. On the other 
hand, what has been important for possible intervention is the development of theories for 
understanding the cognitive basis of autism – for example that it might be caused by a deficit 
in “theory of mind”. This is because cognitive theories only require a translation to an 
adjacent level of explanation (the behavioural) before meaningful intervention principles can 
be developed. This level of translation is hard enough but infinitely more attainable than 
translations over two levels of explanation especially when there is not an intervening 
cognitive link (what cognitive theory of autism hangs on whether biochemical pathway X or 
biochemical pathway Y is the cause of autism?). The “levels” approach shows every sign of 
leading to successful theory development in understanding developmental disorders and 
linking them to their biological substrates (Morton, 2004). We believe that this is a surer 
footing than any available set of neuroscientific facts can provide for those interested in 
developing educational programmes. 
 
None of this is to say that there can be no sound implication of neuroscientific facts and 
theories for educational intervention, just that this is unlikely to occur without at the very 
least the development of an intervening cognitive theory. We can think of no better 
contemporary example than the controversy surrounding DORE Achievement Centres. The 
DORE programme, now with more than 50 centres worldwide, advertises itself as a unique 
medication-free approach to help children who have been “labelled” as suffering from a 
developmental disorder such as dyslexia, ADHD, and dyspraxia. The essence of the 
programme is a series of exercises designed to stimulate the cerebellum. The rationale is 
based on the view that there are good neuroscientific reasons to believe that cerebellar 
functioning may be implicated in many developmental disorders. Be that as it may, there is 
but one study (Reynolds et al., 2003) that claims the program is effective for aiding children 
with a developmental disorder (in this case dyslexia). However, the methodology of this 
study has been severely criticized in a number of ways (Snowling and Hulme, 2003, Rack 
et al., 2007, McArthur, 2007 and Bishop, 2007) – the principal one being that the study did 
not contain an appropriate control group – and led to such a controversy that when a follow-
up report was published in the same journal in 2007, five of the editorial board resigned in 
protest. Our point is that while it may be true that cerebellar functioning is associated with a 
number of disorders, very much more than this has to be done to justify developing a 
remediation curriculum for language disorders based on physical activity. First, we would 
need to discover how the cerebellum is involved in language processing and in particular that 
part of language processing implicated in developmental disorders. Then we would need to 
know how physical activity could change those specific and critical features of the 
cerebellum and in such a way that it could restore a function that already has a developmental 
history. It seems that quasi-neuroscientific speculation can persuade some even in the 
absence of any behavioural evidence in its favour. Such is the danger of not being clear about 
levels of description and explanation. 
 
So how might we do it differently? Our research project (Project KIDS) has a consideration 
of multiple levels of explanation at its core. Our formulation of hypotheses about the ways in 
which different cognitive abilities mature is driven by a cognitive model (Anderson, 1992). 
Over the years these hypotheses have been tested using psychometric and information 
processing measures targeting specific cognitive functions. Most recently we have felt 
confident to extend this hypothesizing to brain-based relationships using ERP recordings of 
children whilst they are performing key cognitive tasks.1 We can then relate both of these 
types of measures to behavioural data relating to the children's psychometric and academic 
performance. In this sequential and integrated way, we can consider and experimentally 
explore hypothesized connections between constructs at different levels of explanation rather 
than guessing at these connections on the basis of unrelated studies taken out of context. This 
work has also provided us with a control group of typically developing children against 
which we can compare children who have been identified, at a behavioural level, as having 
educational problems. One example of such a cohort is children born prematurely. We are 
exploring potential factors that may contribute to the behavioural sequelae of prematurity 
without jumping to the conclusion that any consequence must be brain-based because of the 
interruption to gestation. The hope is that a theory-driven approach informed by the 
integration of biological, cognitive and behavioural data would be more productive for the 
next step which is to translate the suggestions from basic research in cognitive neuroscience 
into appropriate interventions and evaluations of interventions. We are of the view that this 
integrated approach that concurrently addresses multiple levels of explanation should be 
encouraged as a prerequisite for the planning of educational interventions. 
 
1Australian Research Council Discovery Grant DP0665616, Maturation of the brain and the 
development of cognitive abilities. 
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